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Thomas Piketty [1] highlighted that inequality is an 
important concern in most countries nowadays, claiming that 
“capital is back,” as the ratio of capital over income is 
returning to the levels seen at the end of the 19th century. 
Piketty bases his statement on only one of the elements of the 
capital: Housing capital. Thus, in numerous countries rising 
real house prices and shifting distributions of housing wealth 
have driven much of the change he recorded and analyzed. 
If this is the case, housing policy needs to make much use 
of Piketty’s perspective, shaping a new framework for Housing 
Policies in all advanced economies. In this scenario, public 
housing must be one of the main housing policies (if not the 
most significant one), given that providing as many citizens as 
possible with an affordable house is indeed a way to try to fight 
the rising inequalities described by Piketty. 
It does not exist a single definition of the concept “public 
housing”, as it may differ depending on the country or 
jurisdiction analyzed. However, to be able to study this topic in 
this article, we will follow the definition proposed by Lai Har 
Chiu [2], which is the definition used in Hong Kong and 
Singapore: “a wider definition of public housing as applied in 
Hong Kong and Singapore [is that of] cheaper rental or 
owner-occupier housing provided by the government or 
developers involving public funding and public resources 
(e.g.land) not priced at market rates in the production process. 
Housing acquired with the support of consumer subsidy alone 
is excluded”. Being this the case, we will follow the same 
definition when we talk about public housing in Spain. 
The topic of public housing is indeed an area in which not 
only law and economics matter, but also ideology. As Dagen 
Bloom [3] remarks: 
 “The tight connection between leftist modernist 
planning and public housing that began in the 1920s 
has made it nearly impossible to look at  public 
housing as a form of urban shelter or as a kind of 
regular  government service; rather, it has taken on a 
deeper meaning as an  expression of an 
ideological movement of planning and design.”  
In this article, we will analyze this topic from an objective 
perspective, trying to quote all the relevant legislation related 
to this area in both Hong Kong and Spain, as well as the 
current situation. However, we will try to avoid ideological 
debates regarding public housing (even though some idea must 
be introduced), as our idea right now is not to study the 
ideological foundations of this subject from a comparative 
point of view, but only to describe and analyze its current 
situation. 
Abstract— The goal of this paper is to briefly study the 
system of Public Housing in Hong Kong and Spain, and to 
compare them. On the one hand, Hong Kong has more than 7.2 
million residents crammed into a relatively small land mass, 
a fact which, among others, provokes that real estate prices 
are extremely high. Because of the high prices, the 
Government has had to introduce a large system of public 
housing (almost a 46% of Hong Kong’s population lives under 
some of the Public Housing Schemes). On the other hand, in 
Spain, even though Public Housing has a constitutional basis, the 
system remains still very inefficient and far less important than in 
Hong Kong.  
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II. PUBLIC HOUSING IN HONG KONG.
According to Lai Har Chiu [4], “despite its reputation as a 
bastion of the free market economy Hong Kong pioneered the 
development of Asian-style, large scale and multipurpose 
public housing development projects”. Today, Hong Kong’s 
public housing system operates as one of the largest and most 
effective public rental housing programs in the world. 
We are in front of a situation that could seem to be, at first 
sight, a big contradiction: being Hong Kong such a capitalistic 
and financial center, once might have been inclined to consider 
that public housing would remain something almost inexistent. 
However, as we are about to see, this is false, as public housing 
in Hong Kong has indeed a very considerable importance. 
Before the Shek Kip Mei disaster1 in 1953, the Hong Kong 
government had not shown real interest in public housing. 
However, as the first resettlement schemes were being planned, 
it took on a broader role as a housing provider by establishing 
the semi-independent Hong Kong Housing Authority, whose 
goal is precisely to provide low-income housing. In the 
programs that followed, the early building and estates forms, 
and their locations, are of interest for us, as they brought a 
substantial new form to Hong Kong’s urban landscape. 
Before that moment, the British colonial authorities 
adopted a non-interventionist policy in Hong Kong’s housing 
market, a policy that was replaced for a welfarist regime, 
investing in public housing and education to improve political 
stability and to provide cheap labor to industrial development 
[5]. It was through slum clearance with relocating settlers in 
public housing that the government could obtain urban land to 
realize its economic agenda. 
Governor Murray MacLehose’s announcement of a Ten 
Year Housing Programme (1973-1982) proposed the 
construction of 400.000 units to house those who could not 
find accommodation from the private rental housing supply. In 
the mid-1970s, the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) provided 
subsidized build-for-sale units at discount of 20 and 50% on 
1  The Shek Kip Mei disaster took place on Christmas Eve 
1953: a fire caused that nearly 6.000 residents living in Shek 
Kip Mei became homeless. This incident was the cornerstone 
that proved that housing situation was running out of control 
in Hong Kong. To provide accommodation to so many people 
in such a short time, the Skep Kip Mei Estate was built up 
with a functionalistic approach, using a very simple structure 
to maximize the utilization of space. Thus, Shek Kip Mei 
Estate became the first public housing estate, representing a 
milestone in the history of housing development in Hong 
Kong. 
the estimated market price of comparable private-sector 
housing units to those sitting tenants in public rental housing.  
However, Huang [6] remarks that: 
“What’s worth noting is the nature of subsided housing, in 
combination with a resale mechanism at market-related 
prices that can repay the public investment, has 
historically enabled the release of the residual value 
embodied in land circumstances extremely advantageous 
to the government. Considered the leasehold system in 
Hong Kong, the scheme has successfully created a 
commodity from an otherwise partially commodified 
product”. 
Being this the situation, Huang suggests that the actual 
concern of Hong Kong’s government in the 1960s was mostly 
how to fully mobilize un-utilized land value to create public 
revenue, rather than improving housing supply. 
This fact is, once again, another proof of the contradictions 
and dualities existing in Hong Kong’s system: a significant part 
of Hong Kong’s government revenues come from land 
revenues. This is the reason why we stated several times that, 
even if, as a Government which serves the interests of Hong 
Kong inhabitants, the Government of HK is interested in low 
real estate prices, the truth is that an important part of the 
revenues of the Government depend precisely on these prices 
being as high as possible.  
In this sense, as Cullen [7] states, “Hong Kong’s Land 
related Revenue system also means that the effective monopoly 
supplier of land, the Government, has a powerful vested 
interest in maintaining high land prices. Two of the most clear 
adverse (…) of this are: high (often very high) entry prices to 
achieve any sort of home ownership; and an inflation impact 
on the provision of most goods and services due to the high 
costs of renting or buying business premises”. 
Nevertheless, in our opinion, even if the Government 
wants to maximize its getting as high a public revenue as 
possible, we disagree with Huang and we consider that, 
studying the history of public housing in Hong Kong from the 
1950s onwards, the main goal of the Government is actually to 
improve housing supply.  
Anyway, there has been no major housing crisis in Hong 
Kong because of the existence of its public housing system. As 
Lai Har Chiu [4] states, “whatever the official policy objectives 
have been over the years, an important effect of Hong Kong’s 
housing policy has of course been the protection of basic 
housing standards for low-income families(…) But so far, 
except in socialist countries2 where housing is, or was at one 
2 Once again, we observe the “socialist-like” system of land 
related matters in Hong Kong within the world’s most 
capitalistic economic system. 
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stage, considered as a basic welfare good, no Asian 
government has adopted a producer subsidy approach for 
rental provision on a scale comparable to that of Hong Kong” . 
Hong Kong’s public housing system is articulated mainly 
through two different schemes (though there are some minor 
types that we will not analyze): the Public Rental Housing 
(PRH) scheme and the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS). 
Before analyzing them, we must state that the main difference 
between both schemes is that, in PRH, houses are rented at 
discounted rates to low-income residents, while, in HOS, 
housing estates are sold to low-income residents at subsidized 
prices (subsidized owner-occupied housing).  
According to the data provided by the Housing Authority 
of Hong Kong3, as at 31 March 2015, the Authority has a stock 
of 782.700 Subsidized Public Rental Housing (PRH)/interim 
housing flats, accommodating 2.120.000 persons, or  a little bit 
more than 29% of Hong Kong’s total population. The 
Authority plans to build another 76.000 units by 2020.4 The 
average wait to get one of the affordable apartments is 3,1 
years (1,7 for elderly applicants).5 
To this figure, we must add the 16’5% of Hong Kong’s 
population living in subsidized sale flats6 (normally under the 
Home Ownership Scheme).  
Thus, if we put all the figures together, we observe that a 
45.7% of Hong Kong’s total population lives in Public 
Housing, of which a 29,1% lives in rental houses under the 
Subsidized Public Rental Housing (PRH system) and a 16,5% 
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in Subsidized Sale Flats, mostly under the Home Ownership 
Scheme. 
The Hong Kong Housing Authority, created in 1972, 
remains the primary body responsible for running this system 
and for building new public housing. Its primary role is to 
provide subsidized public rental housing (PRH) to low income 
families who cannot afford private rental accommodation. 
Besides, the Authority also operates interim housing and a 
tr nsit center to provide temporary accommodation to families 
facing short-term difficulties in finding suitable 
accommodation. To address precisely this aspiration of lower 
to middle-income families for home ownership, the Authority 
has provided Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) flats. 
In Hong Kong, the Housing Policy formulated, 
coordinated and monitored by the Secretary for Transport and 
Housing. Besides, the Housing Department supports the 
Transport and Housing Bureau in dealing with housing-related 
policies and matters. 
The Government promulgated the Long Term Housing 
Strategy (LTHS)7 on 16 December 2014, which set out three 
strategic directions, namely to avert the current supply-demand 
imbalance: 
“a. to build more public rental housing units and to ensure 
the rational use of existing resources; 
b. to provide more subsidised sale flats, expand the forms
of subsidised home ownership and facilitate the market
circulation of existing stock; and
c. to stabilise the residential property market through
steady land supply and timely demand-side management 
measures, and to promote good sales and tenancy 
practices for private residential properties.” 
According to the Foreword of the LTHS, housing is one of 
the most challenging social issues that Hong Kong is facing 
today. This is because the housing system in Hong Kong is 
characterized by a serious supply-demand imbalance, housing 
prices and rents at a level beyond the affordability of the 
general public, the proliferation of subdivided units, and long 
queues for public rental housing (PRH). 
Being this the scenario, the Strategy adopted a total 
housing supply target of 480.000 units for the ten-year period 
from 2015-2016 to 2024-2025, with a 60:40 public-private split 
in new housing production.8 However, the Strategy recognizes 
8 The details of these projection results, extracted from the text 
of the Strategy, are set out in the Long Term Housing 
Strategy- Implementation Milestones as at December 2014: 
<http://www.thb.gov.hk/eng/policy/housing/policy/lths/Imple
mentationMilestones201412.pdf> 
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that setting a target is the easiest part; the hardest part is to 
achieve that target.  Delivering this target requires an adequate 
and timely supply of land, especially through new development 
areas and the review and rezoning of some existing sites. 
In this sense, Chapter 4 of the Strategy focuses on the 
“Rational Use of Public Rental Housing Resources (PRH)”, 
establishing that: 
“4.1 PRH is the primary housing solution for low-income 
families, and the Government is fully committed to 
providing PRH to those who cannot afford private rental 
housing. The Government achieves this policy objective 
primarily through the HA, which develops and implements 
a public housing programme. 
(…) 
4.4 The primary source of PRH flats is new developments. 
As for redevelopment of aged PRH estates, according to 
the “Refined Policy on Redevelopment of Aged Public 
Rental Housing Estates” formulated by the HA in 2011, 
the HA will consider redevelopment of individual estates 
with reference to four basic principles, viz. structural 
conditions of buildings, cost-effectiveness of repair works, 
availability of suitable rehousing resources in the vicinity 
of the estates to be redeveloped, and build-back potential 
upon redevelopment.”. 
Governance has relevant implications for the formulation 
and performance of the policies that we have just analyzed. 
The next figure shows us the current governance structure of 
the public housing sector in Hong Kong:  
 
FIGURE NUMBER 1: Governance structure of the public 
housing sector. Source: Rebecca Lai Har Chiu [4]. 
    The main concerns regarding the structure of governance 
include how stakeholders dominate the formulation and 
implementation of public housing policy, and whether the 
framework of governance enables better fulfillment of the 
needs of low-income families, according to Lai Har Chiu [4]. 
   To achieve this goal of fulfilling the need of low-income 
families, the Housing Authority implements the Quota and 
Points System (QPS) for non-elderly one-person applicants. 
According to the data provided by the Government9, as at 31 
March 2015, there were about 140.600 QPS applications. 
Unlike general applicants, under QPS: 
• the allocation of the flat is subject to an annual quota;
• the priority of applicants is determined by a points system;
and
• the target of providing the first flat offer at around three
years on average is not applicable to QPS applicants.
    To ensure that PRH flats are allocated to people in genuine 
need, the Government has implemented the next measures 
(source, Housing Authority): 
• “allocation of PRH flats to eligible general applicants
in accordance with the order of registration;
• to be eligible, applicants and their family must
undergo tests covering income and assets, and must
not own or co-own or have an interest in any domestic
property in Hong Kong (for example: trustee,
executor, administrator or beneficiary having
interests in Hong Kong will not be eligible); or have
entered into agreement to purchase any domestic
property in Hong Kong, or hold more than 50% of
shares in a company which owns, directly or through
its subsidiaries, any domestic property 10  in Hong
Kong.  At the time of allocation, at least half of the
family members included in the application must have
lived in Hong Kong for seven years and all family
members must be still living in Hong Kong;
• public rental tenancies cannot be passed on
automatically from one generation to the next. When a
tenant dies, a new authorized person, other than the
9 Government of Hong Kong,  
Fact Sheet on Housing (2015) 
<http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/housing
.pdf> 
10  Domestic property includes any domestic property, 
uncompleted private domestic property, rooftop structure 
approved by the Building Authority, domestic building lots 
and Small House Grants approved by the Lands Department. 
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surviving spouse, is subject to a comprehensive means 
test; and 
• long-term tenants (those who have stayed in public
rental housing for 10 or more years) with incomes
and assets exceeding the limits are required to pay
additional rent or leave their flats.”
      The Housing Authority sets PRH rents at an affordable 
level. As established in the Housing Ordinance (Cap283), the 
Housing Authority will conduct a review every two years and 
adjust PRH rent upward and downward according to the 
changes in the overall household income of PRH tenants. As at 
31 March 2015, according to the Government, PRH rent 
ranged from about 320$ to 4260$ and the average rent was 
about 1700$ per month. 
    Anyway, to sum up public housing in Hong Kong, we must 
conclude by remarking once again the importance of public 
housing in Hong Kong, mainly under the two principal 
schemes, PRH and HOS that, in total, provide housing for 
almost a 50% of Hong Kong’s total population. 
III. I S THERE A PROPERTY BUBBLE IN HONG KONG?
The Government of Hong Kong is the monopoly 
supplier of land and, at the same time, the predominant 
provider of housing. It is the monopoly supplier of land 
because of the system of landholding existing in Hong Kong 
(a system in which all the land is vested to the Government 
and there is no freehold land except for the land in which St. 
John’s Cathedral stands, being all land under a leasehold 
regime). 
     And it is the predominant provider of housing because the 
Government decides how many new public houses should be 
built, and the Government is in charge of building them, 
through the Housing Authority, as we already explained. 
    It seems clear that one of Hong Kong’s (if not the main one) 
biggest concerns is high real estate prices. Even if, when 
academics talk about high real estate prices they mainly refer 
to prices in private housing, there exists a clear relationship 
between public housing and private housing that should not be 
denied: the more expensive private housing is, the more 
people are going to need to get access to some kind of public 
housing. 
   In this sense, the Centa-City Index11 shows us that average 
home sale prices have skyrocketed over 300 percent since 
2003 average home sale prices have skyrocketed over 300 
percent since 2003, and the tendency seems for prices to keep 
increasing, or at least not decreasing: 
FIGURE NUMBER 2: Centa-City Index at September 2016. 
Source: Centadata. 
      There is no single cause for this constant increase in real 
estate prices in Hong Kong, but many: lack of building land, 
demographic trends and rising population, Government 
policies regarding land premia, land-hoarding by developers, 
investments in the real estate market from Mainland Chinese 
investors, an undervalued Hong Kong dollar… Our goal in 
this article is not to study all these causes, as this would be 
material for an article per se. Our goal is to study if there is a 
property bubble in Hong Kong  
    A property or real estate bubble may be defined, according 
to Roberts, as “a temporary situation where asset prices 
become elevated beyond any realistic fundamental valuations 
because the general public believes current pricing is justified 
by probable future price increases” [8]. The problem is, if this 
belief is sufficiently important to make an important number 
of people to purchase the asset (in this case, real estate assets), 
then prices will continue to rise. Thus, more people will be 
convinced to buy. This gives birth to a self-sustaining 
11 It is compiled by the real estate agency Centaline and the 
City University of Hong Kong. According to the CityU, “the 
Centa-City Index (CCI) is a monthly index based on all 
transactions records as registered with the Land Registry to 
reflect property price movements in the previous 1-2 months. 
As land registration takes time, any index based on the Land 
Registry's sale and purchase data inevitably could not provide 
the most up-to-date information. On the other hand, index 
based on the current contract price data is a good indicator of 
the most recent price movements in property agent market 
share, thus the Centaline transaction data are able to reflect 
the market situation." 
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reaction, until the pool of buyers is exhausted and the volume 
of buying declines.  
    Consequently, prices will stop rising and they will even fall, 
as the buyers no longer believe that future prices will increase. 
And, at the end, it becomes possible that this bubble bursts (in 
the same way that the bubble burst in Spain because of the 
global financial crisis in 2008): 
“Once prices begin to fall, the fear of being priced 
‘out’ forever changes to a fear of being priced ‘in’ 
forever. A buyer who overpaid and over-borrowed 
will be in a circumstance where they owe more on 
their mortgage than the property is worth on the 
open market. They cannot sell because they cannot 
pay off the mortgage. They become trapped in their 
homes until prices increase enough to allow a 
breakeven sale. This puts the conditions in place to 
reverse the cycle and causes prices to drop 
precipitously” [8]. 
   Real estate bubbles normally occur following a land boom, 
as we have just explained. To identify bubbles before they 
burst, economists have developed several financial ratios and 
economic indicators that are used to evaluate whether homes 
in an area are fairly valued.  If current levels are compared to 
previous levels that have been unsustainable in the past (i.e. 
led to crashes, for example), a guess can be made as to 
whether a given real estate market is experiencing a bubble. In 
this sense, these indicators describe the two related aspects of 
a housing bubble: the valuation component, which measures 
how expensive houses are compared to what most people can 
afford, and the debt component, which measures how indebted 
households become in buying them for home or profit, and 
also how much exposure the banks accumulate by lending for 
them.  
   When talking about the housing affordability measures, the 
price to income ratio (PIR) is the basic affordability measure 
for housing in a given area. On the other hand, when talking 
about housing debt measures, the housing debt to income ratio 
is the basic measure, and it measures the ratio of mortgage 
payments to disposable income. 
    Now that we have already analysed what a real estate 
bubble is, we have to ask: is there a real estate bubble in Hong 
Kong? The answer to this question is not simple at all. In fact, 
there are many theorists who claim that there actually exists a 
property bubble in Hong Kong, while other theorists claim 
otherwise.  
  Among the authors who claim that there is a real estate 
bubble in Hong Kong, we can claim the economist Eugene 
Lai, who, in his article “The Present And Future of Hong 
Kong’s Property Bubble”, posted in the website The Market 
Mogul12, considers that there exists a property bubble in 
Hong Kong which has been induced due to an increasing 
demand and an insufficient supply for housing: 
FIGURE NUMBER 3: Causes of the Property Price Bubble in 
Hong Kong. Source:  Eugene Lai (2016). 
     Following Lai, the author makes reference to studied 
carried on by the Real Estate Research of the bank UBS in 
which it was stated that Hong Kong might be facing another 
financial bubble as current housing prices are seen as 
“fundamentally unjustified”, meaning this that benchmark 
metrics such as the previously quoted price-to-income ratio ad 
price-to-rent rations have reached all-time highs.  
  In fact, Lai [9] quotes four reasons that, in his opinion, 
explain why there is a property bubble in Hong Kong:  
1. The lack of building land. This is indeed a big
problem in Hong Kong’s real estate system, as
there is a mismatch between the demand of the
society and the supply of land.
2. Low percentage share of GDP of the
construction industry and real estate services. Lai
points out that, comparing Hong Kong and
similar economies such as Singapore, Hong
Kong has an average ratio of approximately 8%
while that of Singapore is approximately 14 %
annually. Such little amounts of investment
would lower gross living space of Hong Kong,
resulting in a mismatch between gross living
space and the Hong Kong population.
12 Lai, Eugene, “The Present and Future of Hong Kong’s 
Property Bubble”. 
In The Market Mogul (2016): 
<http://themarketmogul.com/the-present-and-future-of-hong-
kongs-property-bubble/?nabc=1> 
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3. Government policies. These last few years, “the 
Government has tried to implement different 
policies to curb property prices by trying to 
eliminate speculators from the market” (Lai, 
2016). An example of this policy is the Double 
Stamp Duty, which targets non-first-time buyers 
and which is the doubling of stamp duty in 
property purchase valued at HK$2 million or 
above to 8.5% from previous 4.25%, as well as 
Buyer’s Stamp Duty (BSD), which is a 15% tax 
levied specifically on companies and non-




Lai considers that “even if it is true that these 
policies have reduced the sale volume by 
eliminating speculators from the market (as the 
next figure shows us), it is also true that there 
might be a psychological effect on the supply 
side, as policies might affect the property 
developer’s perspective on the projected 
weakening demand and and prospects of the 
market due to increase in transaction costs, thus 
the willingness for producers to supply more 
properties would decrease. Therefore, in the 
long run, the supply of properties decreases, 
which will undoubtedly push up the property 
price.” (Lai, 2016). 
 
4. Globalised financial markets. In the past, 
homebuyers were mainly local people, while 
currently foreign investors are entering the Hong 
Kong real estate market. Being this the case, the 
continuous capital inflow into Hong Kong has 
kept home prices high and made home 
ownership increasingly unaffordable. 
 
   However, we consider that there is no property bubble in 
Hong Kong, but a constant increase in prices. In our opinion, 
no bubble will burst in Hong Kong, as there is enough 
liquidity backing the system, and the last cooling measures 
introduced will probably prove to be successful at the end 
(Double Stamp Duty).  
 
   In the worst case scenario, we think that there will be 
corrections in real estate prices, but not the burst of a bubble, 
at least not in the next years. 
   
   Carrie Lam, the new Chief Executive of Hong Kong, 
admitted that the property market has left ordinary Hong Kong 
people behind, and that the only key is to provide more public 
housing.  In this sense, Carrie Lam proposed the “public-
private partnership scheme”. In this scheme, the idea is that 
developers instead of the Housing Authority will take up the 
construction of public housing projects. 
 
 It is too soon to know if this project will be successful or not, 
but it seems a good step. At least, it shows that politicians in 
Hong Kong are aware that providing more public housing is 
indeed the key. 
 
IV.  P UBLIC HOUSING IN SPAIN. 
 
   Regarding public housing in Spain, there are two features 
that differ from the system in Hong Kong, as we will explain 
thoroughly through the next few pages. First of all, public 
housing in Spain has a constitutional basis, while in Hong 
Kong it does not. Secondly, the importance, statistically 
speaking, of public housing in Spain is much more reduced 
than in Hong Kong, as we will see. 
 
     Article 47 of the Spanish Constitution (SC from now on) 
regulates the right to housing, stating that (the translation is 
ours; please check the footnote to see the original Spanish 
text)13: 
“ All Spaniards have the right to enjoy decent and 
adequate housing. The public authorities shall 
promote the necessary conditions and establish 
appropriate standards in order to make this right 
effective, regulating land use in accordance with the 
general interest in order to prevent speculation. The 
community shall have a share in the benefits accruing 
from the town-planning policies of public bodies. “ 
 
       However, there is a problem related to this right to 
housing: it was not included in the Spanish Constitution as a 
fundamental right (arts.30-38), but as a guiding principle of the 
government action in social and economic matters (arts.39-52). 
This distinction is relevant from a legal point of view, as rights 
are enforceable, while these guiding principles are a guideline 
to the public authorities telling them how they should proceed.  
 
        In this sense, art.53 SC establishes that these principles 
will inform the legislation, judges and public powers, but will 
be directly enforceable only if there is a law that develops 
them.  
 
          Being this the case, these principles contained in Chapter 
III SC are no actual rights. In this sense, the Spanish 
                                                          
13 Spanish Constitution, Art.47, original Spanish text: 
“Todos los españoles tienen derecho a disfrutar de una 
vivienda digna y adecuada. Los poderes públicos promoverán 
las condiciones necesarias y establecerán las normas 
pertinentes para hacer efectivo este derecho, regulando la 
utilización del suelo de acuerdo con el interés general para 
impedir la especulación. 
La comunidad participará en las plusvalías que genere la 
acción urbanística de los entes públicos.” 
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Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) stated in its case 
STC 80/1982, of December 20th, that (the translation into 
English is ours)14 “the immediate legal value of articles 39-52 
of the Spanish Constitution must be balanced taking into 
consideration what is established in article 53.3 [which] does 
not allow us to considerate them rules without content, forcing 
the public powers to have them into consideration when 
interpreting the rest of constitutional rules as well as the 
laws”.  
 
         It does not imply, however, that these principles, among 
which we find the so-called “right to housing”, have no legal 
relevance or are void of content.  The content of the right to 
housing is quite wide, so wide that we will only analyze some 
of its features, the features that will allow us to study public 
housing in Spain afterwards. 
 
        Apart from being a constitutional principle as well as a 
subjective right15, it is a right of access to housing as well, a 
subjective right to access housing (and it is so even if it was 
drafted as a principle only, because of the legal development 
that has taken place based on art.47 SC). This is indeed the 
most significant content derived from art.47 SC, a, according to 
López Ramón [10] (the translation into English is ours)16, “the 
lack of this content would mean that the subjective right to 
housing would be only the right recognized to those people 
already having a house to enjoy it”. This subjective right 
means that the public authorities in Spain have a duty of 
providing housing to those that cannot obtain it in the housing 
market. Therefore, public housing in Spain has a constitutional 
basis. 
 
         As we explained before, every social right as well as 
every constitutional principle, to be actually enforced, must be 
turned into legislation, a legislation that should determine the 
                                                          
14 Original Spanish text of this extract of the STC 80/1982: 
"El valor normativo inmediato de los artículos 39 a 52 de la 
Constitución ha de ser modulado en los términos del artículo 
53.3 de la Norma Fundamental [precepto que] impide 
considerarlos normas sin contenido, obligando a los poderes 
públicos a tenerlos presentes en la interpretación tanto de las 
restantes normas constitucionales como de las leyes" 
15 The right to housing can be considered a subjective right as 
long as we take into consideration the legislative development 
that has taken place in this subject based on art.47 SC (even 
though art.47 SC, as we have just explained, is not directly a 
subjective right but a principle). 
16 Original Spanish text of López Ramón’s quote  [10]: 
“E llo es así sin duda porque se trata del contenido más 
importante, en ausencia del cual el derecho subjetivo a la 
vivienda equivaldría simplemente al derecho de quienes 
dispusieran de vivienda a disfrutar de la misma”. 
xact content of the right. The lack or scarcity of legislative 
development cannot imply the denial of that subjective right. 
More specifically, the right of access to housing must be 
understood as directed to those people who do not have money 
enough.  
 
        Because of all that, we can affirm that there exists in the 
Spanish law a subjective right of access to housing as a feature 
derived from the subjective right of housing (art.47 SC) and 
developed on art.5.a) of the Consolidated Land Act (Texto 
Refundido de la Ley del Suelo), as well as in some Statutes of 
Autonomy.  
     Article 5.a) of the Consolidated Land Act establishes that 
all the Spanish citizens have the right to (the translation is 
ours)17: 
 
“Enjoy a decent, adequate and accessible house, 
according to the principle of design for every person, 
that constitutes its home, free of noise and other 
contaminating immission of any kind that exceeds the 
maximum limits admitted by the applicable legislation 
and in an adequate environment and landscape”. 
 
        The complete realization of this right to access housing 
(not necessarily as an owner, though) involves that the right 
holder must be carefully determined, as this right is not vested 
to any citizen, bur to those citizens who lack a house and the 
means to get one. As “those citizens who lack a house and the 
means to get one” is a rather ambiguous statement, a detailed 
regulation is needed to establish what income is considered low 
enough, the familiar conditions, whether this right is applied to 
migrant people or not, etc. 
 
        In the Spanish case, the right to access housing is mainly 
implemented through the public housing system; public 
housing in Spain is known as viviendas de protección oficial 
(VPO) (Official Protection Housing, though we will use 
“VPO” from now on) or, more recently, as viviendas 
protegidas (Protected Housing). The main objective of VPO in 
Spain is to permit that those citizens with a lower income can 
acquire or rent decent houses at fair prices according to their 
economic possibilities. As all the different Autonomous 
                                                          
17 Original Spanish text of article 5.a) the Consolidated Land 
Act (Real Decreto Legislativo 7/2015, de 30 de octubre, por el 
que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Suelo y 
Rehabilitación Urbana): 
“Todos los ciudadanos tienen derecho a: 
a) Disfrutar de una vivienda digna, adecuada y accesible, 
concebida con arreglo al principio de diseño para todas las 
personas, que constituya su domicilio libre de ruido u otras 
inmisiones contaminantes de cualquier tipo que superen los 
límites máximos admitidos por la legislación aplicable y en un 
medio ambiente y un paisaje adecuados.” 
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Communities have passed laws on this subject, there is no 
uniform regime in all Spain, which makes the study of this 
topic much more complicated. What we will try to do is to 
provide the main features of the system in this article, as 
studying the legislation of this topic in the 17 Autonomous 
Communities would be redundant. 
 
         The current legislation in this area existing in Spain has 
been adopted during the period corresponding to the property 
bubble, as an attempt by the Autonomous Communities to 
compensate the extremely high prices of the not public houses 
(what is usually called “vivienda libre”, free housing).  In this 
sense, autonomic laws have tried to find a balance between the 
two objectives of public housing in Spain, namely providing 
housing in lower prices to low income citizens and giving 
incentives to promoters in order to allow them cheaper houses, 
by providing them with affordable land. 
 
       Regarding the subjective requirements to get access to 
public housing, the autonomic legislation has developed some 
complex mechanisms whose goal is to make sure that only 
those who are really in need may have access to public 
housing, even though the requirements are different depending 
on the Autonomous Community. The demand for public 
housing is such that public housing is normally granted by 
draw. 
 
        Apart from that, there is such a need of affordable land 
that some plans and some autonomic legislation has included 
some standards regarding the minimal percentages of public 
housing, what is known as reservas de suelo (land reserves). 
This concept refers to that percentage of new houses that will 
have to be public within a plan. In this sense, article 20.1.b) of 
the Consolidated Land Act establishes a land reserve from, at 
least, a 10% to the 30% of the new residential buildable area18.  
                                                          
18  Original Spanish text of article 20.1b) the Consolidated 
Land Act (Real Decreto Legislativo 7/2015, de 30 de octubre, 
por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Suelo y 
Rehabilitación Urbana): 
1. Para hacer efectivos los principios y los derechos y 
deberes enunciados en el título preliminar y en el 
título I, respectivamente, las Administraciones 
Públicas, y en particular las competentes en materia 
de ordenación territorial y urbanística, deberán: 
 (…) 
 b) Destinar suelo adecuado y suficiente para usos 
productivos y para uso residencial, con reserva en 
todo caso de una parte proporcionada a vivienda 
sujeta a un régimen de protección pública que, al 
menos, permita establecer su precio máximo en 
venta, alquiler u otras formas de acceso a la 
vivienda, como el derecho de superficie o la 
concesión administrativa. Esta reserva será 
      At last, before ending the study of public housing in Spain, 
we must analyze the statistics in order to see how significant 
(or not) it is in Spain. When it comes to analyzing the date, the 
main problem we are facing is that there are actually no data 
regarding how many Spanish citizens live under some of the 
kinds of public housing, or how many public houses in total 
exist in Spain. This lack of data is a clear proof of the 
inefficiency of the system of public housing in Spain.   
 
       We have identified the reasons that allow us to state that 
the system of public housing in Spain is inefficient and 
obsolete, and requires an urgent update (otherwise, it will lose 
its sense): 
1. The lack of a uniform regime in Spain: the Central 
Government and the 17 Autonomous Communities 
pass laws in this area, so the system becomes very  
complicated. One of the results of these complications 
is what we just explained, the lack of reliable data 
stating how many people live in public houses. 
2. Another inefficiency of the system is the fact that, in 
some Spanish provinces (in 10 of the 52 provinces), 
the price of “private” houses is indeed lower than the 
price of public houses, which is an absolute 
contradiction.19 
3. According to the same source (El Mundo), 330.000 
citizens have applied for some kind of public house, 
though they are still waiting. At the same time, 
however, 13.500 public houses are empty.20 
 
                                                                                                     
determinada por la legislación sobre ordenación 
territorial y urbanística o, de conformidad con ella, 
por los instrumentos de ordenación, garantizará una 
distribución de su localización respetuosa con el 
principio de cohesión social y comprenderá, como 
mínimo, los terrenos necesarios para realizar el 30 
por ciento de la edificabilidad residencial prevista 
por la ordenación urbanística en el suelo rural que 
vaya a ser incluido en actuaciones de nueva 
urbanización y el 10 por ciento en el suelo 
urbanizado que deba someterse a actuaciones de 
reforma o renovación de la urbanización.” 
19 Source : 
 El Mundo (2015) 
<http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2015/06/02/556c98604616
3f5f298b458f.html> 
20 The topic of empty houses (viviendas vacías) in Spain is a 
topic that is being studied by many scholars right now, 
because of its practical importance. 
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       Being this the case, there are no data regarding the total 
amount of citizens living in public houses, as we said. The 
Spanish Ministry of Development (Ministerio de Fomento)21 
provides some data related to public housing, but they only 
provide the total number of provisional and definitive public 
housing gradings per year from 1991 to 2016, data that are 
insufficient for our study, even though they allow us to see the 
significant reduction of public houses planned (these data are, 
once again, a proof of how inefficient the Spanish system is, as, 
how can a system work correctly if the central Government 
does not know for sure how many public houses exist in the 
whole of Spain and how can it be efficient if some people wait 




FIGURE NUMBER 2: Provisional and Definitive Public 
Housing Gradings in State and Autonomic Plans. Source: Oriol 
Caudevilla, after the data extracted from the Spanish Ministry 
of Development (2017). 
 
       Only some authors, like Rodríguez Alonso [11], have tried 
to analyse the total amount of Spanish citizens living in public 
rental houses (not including in these data those people who 
own a public house after buying it in a lower subsidized price, 
but only those who rent some kind of public house). Rodríguez 
Alonso states that, in Spain, only a 1% of the total houses is 
intended to be rented under a public housing rental scheme. 
This statistic is extremely alarming, as the total percentage is 
inferior than in many other European countries, which is a 
proof, once again, of how inefficient this system is. In this 
sense, the next figure shows us what we have just explained:  
                                                          
21 Spanish Ministry of Development (Ministerio de Fomento), 





FIGURE NUMBER 3: Percentage of Public Houses by the 
Total Amount of Houses. Source:  Rodríguez Alonso, after 
data obtained from the CECODHAS The European Liaison 
Committee For Social Housing (2007). 
 
V. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
        To sum up the comparison between the system of public 
housing in Hong Kong and that of Spain, we should conclude 
by saying that, as previously stated, the system in Spain has a 
constitutional basis, while in Hong Kong it as no constitutional 
basis, but it is formally a policy implemented by the 
government. Apart from that, the main difference is the 
importance and efficiency of the system in each jurisdiction: 
while in Hong Kong almost a 50% of the population live in 
public houses, in Spain this figure remains unknown (though 
some studies suggest only a 1% of the total houses in Spain are 
public houses). This lack of data also shows us the fact that, 
while the system in Hong Kong is well planned and designed, 
the system of public housing in Spain is not only much less 
important, but also not well organized.  
 
         In the case of Hong Kong, we consider that Public 
Housing has shaped Hong Kong. In other words, in our 
opinion, Hong Kong would not be Hong Kong if Public 
Housing had not been so outstanding. In the programs that 
followed the Shek Kip Mei disaster, the early building and 
estates forms, and their locations, brought a substantial new 
form to Hong Kong’s urban landscape. The first public houses 
consisted generally of slab blocks, rising to twenty storeys, 
placed in angular, often rectilinear formations. As Shelton [12] 
reminds us, “facilities were more extensive and space 
standards more generous than in resettlement housing: for 
instance, they included, kitchen, bathroom and balcony and the 
space allocation was almost double with 3’9m2 per person”. 
On the other hand, in Spain, we cannot affirm that Public 
Housing has shaped the country, as it has been a not very 
relevant  area as we have just seen. 
 
   We have already studied whether there exists or not a 
property bubble in Hong Kong, concluding that, even though 
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most authors consider that there is one, this is not the case, in 
our opinion.  
   
 There is a constant increase in prices, but no bubble, as there 
is enough liquidity backing the system, and the last cooling 
measures introduced will probably prove to be successful at 
the end (Double Stamp Duty).  
 
   In the worst-case scenario, we think that there will be 
corrections in real estate prices, but not the burst of a bubble, 
at least not in the next years. 
   
   We have also quoted Carrie Lam, the new Chief Executive 
of Hong Kong, who admitted that the property market has left 
ordinary Hong Kong people behind, and that the only key is to 
provide more public housing.  
 
    In the next figure, we make a graphic comparison of both 


















Hong Kong Spain 
Regulation 
No constitutional or legal basis. Public housing is a 
policy set out by the Government and implemented 
by the Housing Authority. 
Constitutional basis and legislative development: State 
l gislative development and legislative development by 
the Autonomous Communities as well. 
Importance 
High importance: almost a 50% of Hong Kong's 
population lives in Public Houses (45,7%). 
Little importance. The Government has surprisingly no 
data, but studies suggest that only a 1% of Spanish 
houses are intended to be rented under a public housing 
rental scheme. 
Level of Efficiency 
Efficient system: a significant part of the population 
is covered by the system and data are clear. 
I efficient system: lack of data, no uniform regime 
because of the Autonomous Communities, prices of 
public houses sometimes higher than the ones of 
"private" houses and citizens waiting for public houses 
while many of them are empty. 
Schemes 
HOS (subsidized build-for-sale unites)/ PRH (rental 
at discounted rates) 




Centralized system, policies implemented by the 
Housing Authority. 
No uniform centralized regime as most Autonomous 
Communities have passed laws on this subject. 
Eligibility 
Requirements 
Quota and Points System, the basis is the low 
income. Main requirements: a) be at least 18 years 
old; b) the applicant and family members must be 
residing in HK and have the right to land in HK; c) 
the applicant's household monthly income and total 
net asset must not exceed the prevailing limits; d) 
the applicant and his family must possess no 
domestic property in HK, and e)at the time of the 
allocation, at least half of the family members must 
have lived in HK for 7 years and still live in HK. 
Point system too, the basis is the income as well. 
Autonomous Communities may establish extra 
requirements, but these are the general requirements: a) 
not having been granted a public house previously; b) 
not owning a "private" house in property; c) being 
registered in a  public Registrar of Public House 
Applicants; d)c) the applicant's household monthly 
income and total net asset must not exceed the 
prevailing limits; e) not having obtained any kind of 
housing subsidy in the last 10 years. 
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